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BOOK REVIEW
CLOSED MINDS AND AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS?
Steven Lubett
In a recent issue of the Cornell Law Review, Professor Jonathan
R. Macey utilizes a book review of Allan Bloom's The Closing of the
American Mind I as a platform from which to launch his own critique
of the current state of legal education in the United States.2 Macey
is critical of Bloom, 3 but agrees with his observation that American
educational values are in decline. 4 Otherwise, Macey finds that
Bloom is "dead wrong about the cause of this decline, ' 5 and that
Bloom's solutions range from dangerous to ridiculous. 6 From this
juncture, Macey proceeds to use Bloom's work as a foil for a description of the 'malaise' gripping American law schools." 7 While
his references to clinical teaching are not detailed, I read Macey to
say that this malaise seems at least in part to be the fault of clinical
education.
It is remarkable that Macey's agenda allows him, in a single
eight-page essay, to take aim at both "absolute" classical education
a la Allan Bloom and contemporary skills training a la the clinical
education movement. He could not have considered two more
widely disparate views of education. Further, Macey manages to
miss each target. He misinterprets Bloom, and in his prescription
for legal education fails to consider the profession.
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3 See, e.g., id. at 1038 ("Allan Bloom is a very frustrated and unhappy fellow."); id
at 1039 ("[H]is cure... would be far worse than the disease itself."); id. at 1040 ("Professor Bloom believes that his way is the only way."); id. at 1042 ("It seems to me more
likely that Bloom is screaming because modern educational trends are pushing the focal
point of American education further and further away from his orbit."); id at 1045 ("Allan Bloom's desperate appeal").
4 Id. at 1038.
5 Id.
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MACEY AND BLOOM

Allan Bloom achieved both fame and best-sellerdom by arguing
that the American university system has fallen upon irredeemably
hard times. While his thesis has been subject to considerable elision, if not caricature, in both the popular and the academic press,
his general proposition is that the rise of "relativism" as an education norm has led to a corresponding loss of interest in the search
for an absolute understanding of knowledge and truth. This development deprives undergraduate education of its structural coherence, since students are now free to pursue a pastiche of value-free
curricular offerings, all in the name of an undefinable relevance. In
turn, such incoherence deprives the broader society of a truly educated class, since the common frame of reference for education is all
but abolished.
Macey and others describe Bloom's work as a call for a "return
to the classics." 8 However, this is only partially correct. Bloom has
instead called for the university to rededicate itself to developing
shared cultural and intellectual norms, including the identification
of non-comparative values. Bloom uses his own experience with
"the classics" to illustrate the power and beauty of classical education, but he does not limit his approved reading list to Plato and
Aristotle. 9
Macey concludes that Bloom is "dead wrong" as to the cause of
the decline of American education.' 0 According to Macey, Bloom
attributes this decline both to the rise of relativism and to the corresponding diminution of the classics." The real answer, according
to Macey, is far more apparent than Bloom's centuries-spanning account of the disintegration of the university curriculum. The true
cause of our dilemma is nothing more than cowardice, or as Macey
reduces it even further, "simple cowardice."' 2 If only we had
known.
In dismissing Bloom's observations and reasoning, Macey continually returns to the theme that modern educators have lost their
8 Macey exemplifies this mistake, ridiculing what he sees as Bloom's "plea for a
return to Platonic dialogue." See Macey, supra note 2, at 1039.
9 See id. at 1043. What Americans lack, according to Bloom, are writers such as
Descartes, Pascal, Montaigne, Rabelais, Montesquieu and Rousseau, who are necessary
to building our spiritual edifice, and who one must have read to be considered educated.
A. BLOOM, supra note 1, at 53.
10 Macey, supra note 2, at 1038.
11 Macey refers to this as "Bloom's unsupported assertion," an interesting term to
apply to a book of nearly 400 pages. Id. The Closing of the American Mind is, in fact, a
closely reasoned and well supported account of the manner in which Bloom believes
relativism to have infected not only education but virtually all civic thought.
12 Id. at 1039.
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nerve: we lack "commitment to excellence in teaching and scholarship;" 13 we invariably choose to "follow the path of least resistance." 14 Bloom no doubt would agree with Macey's description of
an educational system that has lost its will to succeed. 15 Bloom,
however, goes on to search for the cause, or at least an explanation,
of this phenomenon. The antinomian Macey, in contrast, criticizes
the cowardly sinners' loss of faith, without exploring the reasons for
their rejection of salvation.
But how could cowardice be so simple? The United States possesses the largest and broadest system of higher education in the
world. 16 According to both Macey and Bloom, the system's hundreds of independent components have undergone a nearly simultaneous abandonment of "the values and principles that made them
great."' 17 Cowardice might account for a few lapses here and there,
but it hardly explains the imminent demise of our entire university
structure. The events and decisions decried by both Macey and
Bloom have recurred from coast to coast over at least a decade. As
an explanation for such complex phenomena, "simple cowardice" is
an oxymoron.
Macey's proof of Bloom's misdiagnosis is taken from a single
illustration. As an example of the harm occasioned by the abandonment of rights in favors of openness, Bloom cites an incident that
occurred at Cornell University during the 1960s.18 According to
Bloom, a black student's "life had been threatened by a black faculty
member when the student refused to participate in a demonstration," and the university provost refused to take any action to protect the student.' 9 Macey agrees that the professor should have
been fired, but he goes on to criticize: "[Ift seems a bit ridiculous to
insinuate, as Professor Bloom does, that somehow, a different cur13

14

Id.
Id

15 In fact, Bloom repeatedly makes just that point, although one would hardly know
that based only on a reading of Macey's review. For example: "The democratization of
the university helped dismantle its structure and caused it to lose its focus." A. BLOOM,
supra note 1, at 65. "The provost had a mixture of cowardice and moralism not uncommon at the time." Id. at 316. "The universities never performed [their] function very
well. Now they have practically ceased trying." Id. at 256.
16
In 1970 there were 1639 four-year educational institutions in the United States,
employing over one-half million faculty at the rank of instructor or above. By 1986 the
number of institutions had increased to 1915, with a corresponding increase in faculty.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS (1988).
17
Macey, supra note 2, at 1039.

A. BLOOM, supra note 1, at 316.
Id. Bloom's description of the incident is open to question. Was the student's
life seriously threatened, or was the professor merely guilty of a rhetorical excess? Certainly there is no documented case of a student, in the 1960s or at any other time, having
been harmed by a professor for refusal to attend a demonstration.
18

19
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riculum would have given the provost the moral courage to carry
out the responsibilities of his office. Simple cowardice is to
20
blame."
Bloom, however, insinuates nothing of the sort. Rather, he describes the manner in which he believes the steady erosion of a commitment to absolute rights and rational discourse led to an ultimate
inability to stand up for principle. The suggestion that a different
curriculum would not have given the provost additional moral courage is tautological. Bloom's point is slightly more subtle than Macey
allows. Having given in to the forces that led to abandonment of the
classical curriculum, the universities became incapable of resisting
other forces as well. Bloom certainly observes a lack of conviction
among university administrators, but he recognizes this deficiency
as the reflection-not the cause-of a deeper problem. Macey, on
the other hand, seems to confuse the shadow for the thing itself.
In any event, it is at least "a bit ridiculous" for Macey to attribute the campus events of the 1960s, and their contemporary repercussions, to insufficient bravery on the part of professors and
administrators. During the 60s, there were campus rebellions from
San Francisco State to Columbia. Students died from gunshots at
Berkeley and at Kent State. At the same time, urban riots broke out
in Watts and Detroit, a general strike took place in Paris, and tanks
rolled through the streets of Chicago and Prague. The universities
were only one theater in what then was perceived as a transcendent
struggle, if not an outright war. The university curriculum was only
one front, but for Bloom, an important front.
Macey's condemnation of "simple cowardice" calls nothing
more to mind than some grade-B movie, loosely based on Kipling,
in which a frustrated British officer shakes his swagger stick at the
troops: "Courage lads, have courage!" The imagery is stirring, but
it doesn't explain the decay of the British Empire.
Much can be said for courage in academics, but it also has its
downside. Those who are both fearless and certain run the risk of
an overstated case. Macey overstates his critique of both Bloom and
law school as the result of his certainty that a professional education
makes the identical demands as does undergraduate school.
BLOOM AND LAW SCHOOL

What does Bloom's analysis say about the American law school?
The short answer is "virtually nothing." Bloom is concerned first
and all but exclusively with undergraduate education. 2 ' He does
20
21

Macey, supra note 2, at 1039.
A. BLOOM, supra note 1, at 244, 380.
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not devote a page to discussing either legal education or professional school, and nothing in his book suggests that he expects his
methods to be applied outside of liberal, undergraduate programs.
His Index of Proper Names does not contain a single reference to
Langdell, Llewellyn or any other primarily "legal" scholar. 2 2 He
does not count law among the "small number of disciplines that
treat the first principles of all things."'2 3 Rather, he regards law as
an "applied science" that, while beneficial, is "lower in dignity and
' 24
derivative in knowledge."
Of course, Bloom does not approve of relativism in the law
(since it elevates openness above natural rights), 25 but he does not
begin to suggest that the methods of scholarly inquiry-in law or in
any other field-ought to be limited by absolute values.
Macey fails to appreciate Bloom's implicit distinctions between
undergraduate and professional education, and between curriculum
and scholarship. Bloom obviously seeks to impose no limitation on
the manner in which law students are taught. One can only wonder,
then, why Macey framed his strenuous defense of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement-which occupies a central position in his essayas a response to Bloom-inspired ideas. 26 Bloom does refer to
deconstructionism as a fad,2 7 but this hardly seems provocative of
Macey's conclusion that Bloomthought is a threat to free inquiry in law
28
schools.
Macey does not bite down on the hard issues: What is the relationship between law school and undergraduate school? What is the
role of professional school in university education? Indeed, he uses
a debater's trick to avoid this very question. First, Macey assumes
that the mission of law school and the mission of the larger university are identical. 29 Then he demonstrates that Bloom's model for
undergraduate education just won't do for law school. Finally, he
asserts this failing as a refutation not only of Bloom, but also of
those whom he associates by fiat with Bloom. This allows Macey
first to raise and then to shrug off, the attacks on Critical Legal Studies that Carrington, Van Alstyne and others have leveled.3 0
Carrington's concern, however, is not about Critical Legal
22

There is one reference to Oliver Wendell Holmes and another to Hugo Black,

neither in the context of legal education. Id. at 28, 62.
23

Id. at 261.

24

Id. The other beneficial applied sciences are medicine and engineering.

25

Id. at 29.

26

Macey, supra note 2, at 1041, 1042.

27
28

A. BLOOM, supra note 1, at 379.
Macey, supra note 2, at 1040-43.

29

Id. at 1042.

30

Id. at 1041, 1042.
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Studies as an academic discipline; he does not suggest that Grits
would be out of place in a philosophy, political science or literature
department.3 1 Rather, Carrington's concern is the potential effect
of Critical Legal Studies on the practice of law: "Faced with such
impediments to belief in law, who can fail to have doubts about the
validity of their professionalism as lawyers?" 32 Only a few law students ever embark upon academic careers. The vast majority become employed at large law firms and other private institutions.
Carrington's worry is that a value-free approach to the study of law
may lead, even if unintentionally, to a value-free approach to the
practice of law. Contrary to Macey's assertion that it may be "Pollyannaish [to teach] that law inevitably plays a civilizing and constraining role in society," 3 3 clear-headed realism recognizes that the
health of our legal system depends upon the individual lawyer's re34
spect for the rule of law.
One need not agree with Carrington (and I don't) to recognize
that he poses a very different question from the one raised by
Bloom, not to mention the one ignored by Macey. To assess the
"malaise" gripping American law schools we must consider the nature and meaning of professional education.
MACEY AND LAW SCHOOL

Macey identifies three major topics in the current debate about
the direction of legal education: "the place of Critical Legal Studies
in the law school curriculum, the merits of clinical education and the
35
role of interdisciplinary work, particularly law and economics."
The choice of words tells a story-we must consider the "place" of
Critical Legal Studies and the "role" of law and economics. In
other words, these movements are assumed to belong in the law
school world, and only their relative importance or emphasis is subject to debate. Concerning clinical education, however, Macey implies that the discussion is on its "merits." Its position in the
curriculum still seems in doubt. Macey's response indicates his understanding that clinical teaching is marginal at many law schools,
but he disclaims the possibility that his own words might reflect that
same intolerance.3 6 In fact, he concludes with the suggestion that
clinicians' own "defensiveness" is the problem. 3 7 Students of Femi31 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
32 Id. at 227.
33 Macey, supra note 2, at 1041.
34 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER (1983); William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
35 Macey, supra note 2, at 1038.
36 Jonathon R. Macey, Macey Responds to Lubet, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 959 (1990).
37 Id. at 961.
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nist Legal Theory (among others) will have no difficulty recognizing
this rhetorical device as a benign variation on "blaming the victim."
Although Macey never explicitly discusses the content of
clinical legal education, his articulated conception of excellence
seems to leave little, if any, room for clinical teaching. We need
more Critical Legal Studies and more law and economics, but the
inclusion of clinical courses in the curriculum only panders to the
mob. Law students, apparently the enemies of excellence, will cry
loudly "if they are unable to dilute their work-load by indulging in
the luxury of adding a skills course to their schedule as they while
38
away the spring semester of the third year."
First let us try to understand this position in purely descriptive
terms. In the spring semester of the third year, law students are
only a few months away from entering practice. By the next fall they
will be performing lawyers' tasks and charging fees to clients; they
will be exposed to malpractice liability. Macey, however, refers to
skills training as an unnecessary luxury, undertaken only to avoid
real work. Could he make this argument with a straight face concerning any other professional school? Would Macey entrust his
own well-being and health to an engineer, architect or physician
who had not been trained in professional competencies such as information gathering, fact evaluation, theory choice, and ethical reflection?3 9 Does he think that senior medical students while away
their time with clinical rotations?
Macey's characterization of clinical courses as diluting the curriculum is neither fair nor accurate. Does he have any basis on
which to rest this charge? Has he analyzed the comparative work
loads involved in traditional versus clinical courses? Is he even
aware of the demands of contemporary clinical education? 40 Perhaps Macey's law students never ignore their reading, skip the lectures, or merely cram for exams at the end of the semester, but
plenty of other students do. The skills courses, however, permit no
such luxury. When well taught they require daily preparation and
38
Macey, supra note 2, at 1043. In his response, Macey asserts that I misread his
original Review, which was nothing more than a "plea for tolerance" for all voices, including clinical education. It is good to learn now that Macey is an enthusiastic supporter of clinical teaching. See Macey, supra note 36, at 959. Unfortunately, he described
skills teaching in such sharply negative terms throughout his Review as to convey the
exact opposite position.
39 See DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 2 (1984); EdwardJ.
Imwinkelried, The EducationalPhilosophy of the Trial PracticeCourse: Reweaving the Seamless
Web, 23 GEORGIA L. REV. 663, 675 (1989).
40
See Steven Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy,
37J. LEGAL EDUC. 123 (1987). Macey continues this theme in his response, attributing
the need for closer monitoring of clinical courses to the fact that "students rarely complain about undemanding courses." Macey, supra note 36, at 960.
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allow no unexcused absences. Unlike standard exam courses, and
even seminars, last-minute cramming and paper writing isn't possible in clinical courses. The work either has been done throughout
the semester or it hasn't.
It may be that certain clinical courses are poorly taught, or that
certain teachers demand less than rigorous analysis from their students.4 ' The same shortcomings are no doubt present in grand
rounds at certain teaching hospitals, and, unfortunately beyond argument, law schools contain a good share of lousy Socratic-method
teachers. In every field, however, the failings of a few individuals
hardly illegitimate the entire endeavor.
Macey not only denigrates clinical education, he worries that
the law schools are falling under "the increasing tyranny of skills
courses." 4 2 Tyranny is an unlikely concept to apply to a course of
study that has struggled for its place, and exists at best as a stepchild at many institutions. Are there really law schools where clinicians crack the academic whip, and where traditionalists have fallen
into helotry? The 1988-89 Catalog of the Cornell Law School, for
example, lists only six courses that appear to employ the clinical
method, from a total of sixty-nine. 4 3 None of those courses is required, and none is included among the "core courses" that every
second year student is urged to take. If this is even nascent tyranny,
then Cornell's business law curriculum (at least sixteen courses)
must hold the school in abject thralldom.
Macey's position implies a distrust of law students. He suggests
that if they seem attached to clinical teaching, this must be due to
their own slack vigilance. The popularity of skills classes-as corrupt and seductive as they are-could never be the product of students' rational choice. The faculty, therefore, should "care enough
to fight for high standards and commitment to excellence against
the onslaught of mediocrity." 44 Is Macey saying that law students,
41
42

See id.; Imwinkelried, supra note 39.

Macey, supra note 2, at 1043. Macey's response asserts that he was merely calling
upon law faculties to "think carefully" about how much emphasis to put on skills
courses. Macey, supra note 36, at 959. Readers can draw their own conclusions as to
whether comments such as the above qualify simply as a call for increased attention,
much less a statement of enthusiastic support. In fact, Macey's Review contained not a
single positive word about skills teaching.
43 The six are Negotiation for Lawyers, Trial Advocacy, Handicapped Persons Law
Clinic, Legal Aid I & II, and Family Law Clinic. There is also a course sequence entitled
Practice Training I & II, but from its description it seems to encompass what most law
schools call Legal Writing. I assume that Macey would not categorize the teaching of
legal writing as tyranny. Additionally, "a limited number of students" are allowed to
take a full clinical semester; students must apply for this program during the preceding
academic year and the externships must be approved by a vote of the law school's administrative committee. 1988-89 CORNELL LAW SCHOOL CATALOG 17-21.
44
Macey, supra note 2, at 1043.
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in their self-indulgent sloth, should not be allowed to choose clinical
courses ahead of subjects like finance and philosophy? 4 5
This paternalism is uncharacteristic of Macey. Elsewhere in his
essay he offers market economics as the cure for our suffering primary and secondary schools:
We can lay part of the blame at the feet of public primary and
secondary schools, where parents are unable to affect the quality
of the education their children receive, because no market forces
exist to constrain the shirking of public school officials. For one
thing, parents of public school students cannot shop among alter46
native teachers or rival schools.
But Macey seeks to squelch this very competition within the law
school curriculum.
These conflicting positions suggest a rich irony. Upper-class
law students must surely be among the most sophisticated and informed consumers of education in the world. Increasingly they
have come to law school after having already pursued other careers.
By the third year most have been "summer associates," and many
have already accepted jobs to follow graduation. Still, according to
Macey, we should not trust them to shop among alternative teachers, lest they dilute their work load and while away the semester.
Macey distinguishes primary schools, on the other hand, claiming they only can benefit from the application of market forces. In
the large cities primary education is in the worst repair. In these
same cities many parents of young children are themselves poorly
educated, some are even illiterate, and many are not fluent in English. A good number of these parents are no older than the typical
law student. Macey assumes that these parents will be able to shop
intelligently for schools and teachers and will never opt for easy or
trendy alternatives. Their efficient choices will reward good educators and weed out bad ones. Perhaps he is correct that we need to
establish a "market for education," but it is impossible to fathom
how the application of the market could spell relief for primary
schools and doom for legal education. Macey compares his position
to that of a physician providing medical advice, but the analogy is
45 Clinicians, on the other hand, do not discount the value of courses in philosophy, finance, economics and other fields. Neither Critical Legal Studies nor Law and
Economics is in danger of a clinical kulturkampf. Clinicians recognize the essential role
that both traditional doctrine and nouvelle analysis play in legal education. Clinical
teaching's additional contribution emphasizes the discovery, organization, manipulation, verification, construction and imagination of facts. The so-called "skills courses"
are typically the only place in the law school curriculum where facts are treated as something other than the opening paragraph of an appellate opinion. See FRANCIS KAHN
ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981).
46
Macey, supra note 2, at 1044.
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inapt. 4 7 His Review called for the enforcement of standards against
the "onslaught of mediocrity,"' 48 and that surely must mean something more than merely providing guidance. In any event, my point
is not that student choice should control the law school curriculum,
but rather to note that if markets can help elementary schools, they
have their place in law school as well. Finally, I must note that it
does not minimize paternalism to compare oneself to a doctor. Perhaps Macey, like Bloom, simply doesn't like the competition.
CONCLUSION

Macey's penultimate words on Bloom: "[T]he answer ...

is not

to stifle dissenting voices, but to answer reasoned argument with
reasoned argument, and to balance opposing views in a way that
Bloom would abhor." 49 Just so. Of course, I am on thin ice here.
Jonathon Macey uses his response to identify himself as a friend of
clinical teaching, and it is hardly my goal to persuade him that he is
not. Open discussion of issues should, when we do our jobs well,
always lead to greater clarity. Thus, I am satisfied to have given Macey the opportunity to explain.
I hope that he is no longer depressed, 50 although I still think
that he got Allan Bloom all wrong.

47
48

Macey, supra note 36, at 961.
Macey, supra note 2, at 1043.

49

Id. at 1045.

50

See Macey, supra note 36, at 959.

